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Existing work typically treats incentive design as a bi-objective problem: minimise institutional cost while achieving a high long-run frequency of cooperation. Whether such schemes also maximise social welfare - total population payoff net of institutional expenditure - has remained largely unexplored. We develop a welfare-centric framework for institutional incentives in finite, well-mixed populations playing a social dilemma (Donation Game and Public Goods Game), considering both rewards for cooperators and punishments for defectors. For each mechanism, we derive explicit expressions for expected social welfare and characterise how it depends on incentive efficiency and selection intensity. Analytically, we identify parameter regimes where social welfare has a single optimal inc","title":"Social welfare optimisation under institutional reward and punishment","url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.31330","vendor":"arxiv_cs_ai"},"summary":"arXiv:2605.31330v1 Announce Type: cross \nAbstract: Institutional incentives are widely used to promote cooperation among autonomous, self-regarding agents, from human societies to multi-agent and AI systems. Existing work typically treats incentive design as a bi-objective problem: minimise institutional cost while achieving a high long-run frequency of cooperation. Whether such schemes also maximise social welfare - total population payoff net of institutional expenditure - has remained largely unexplored. We develop a welfare-centric framework for institutional incentives in finite, well-mixed populations playing a social dilemma (Donation Game and Public Goods Game), considering both rewards for cooperators and punishments for defectors. For each mechanism, we derive explicit expressions for expected social welfare and characterise how it depends on incentive efficiency and selection intensity. 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